Abstract Designated verifier signature (DVS) allows a signer to convince a designated verifier that a signature is generated by the signer without letting the verifier transfer the conviction to others, while the public can still tell that the signature must be generated by one of them. Strong DVS (SDVS) strengthens the latter part by restricting the public from telling whether the signature is generated by one of them or by someone else. In this paper, we propose two new SDVS schemes. Compared with existing SDVS schemes, the first new scheme has almost the same signature size and meanwhile, is proven secure in the standard model, while the existing ones are secure in the random oracle model. It has tight security reduction to the DDH assumption and the security of the underlying pseudorandom functions. Our second new scheme is the first SDVS supporting non-delegatability, the notion of which was introduced by Lipmaa, Wang and is provably secure in the random oracle model based on the discrete logarithm assumption and Gap Diffie-Hellman assumption.
Introduction
In undeniable signature [9] , given a signature from Alice (the signer), Bob (the verifier) cannot check the validity of it by himself. Instead, Alice proves the validity (or invalidity) of the signature to Bob interactively. Alice can decide when to prove, but not whom to prove to. In Eurocrypt 1996, Jakobsson et al. [16] introduced the notion of designated verifier proofs (DVP), which allows Alice to designate a verifier, say Bob and proves the validity of a statement only to Bob. Bob cannot transfer this conviction to anyone else. This is called non-transferability and is usually achieved by proving either the validity of the statement or the knowledge of Bob's secret key, so that Bob is also able to produce the 'same' proof transcript. Designated verifier signature (DVS) is the noninteractive version of DVP. A DVS is publicly verifiable and a valid DVS means that it is generated either by Alice or by Bob. Applications of DVS include voting [16] , undeniable signature [12] , deniable authentication [32] and several other cryptographic schemes where it is required that only certain parties can be convinced on something.
Also first pointed out in [16] , in some applications, it is desirable if other than Alice and Bob, a third party cannot tell if a designated signature for Bob is indeed from Alice or from someone else. This motivates a variant of DVS called Strong Designated Verifier Signature (SDVS) [16] . An SDVS requires that no third party can tell in a computationally indistinguishable way on which signer is the one who generated a given SDVS. SDVS was not formalized until 2004 [19] where Laguillaumie and Vergnaud defined a property called 'privacy of signer's identity' which captures the 'strongness' of SDVS.
Jakobsson et al. [16] suggested a generic approach for constructing SDVS. Each user in the system holds two key pairs, one for DVS and the other for public key encryption. To sign a message M, Alice uses her signing key to generate a DVS signature on M for Bob and encrypts the signature under Bob's encryption key. The ciphertext is set as an SDVS. Upon receiving the SDVS, Bob decrypts it and checks the signature's validity using the DVS verification keys of both Alice and Bob. This approach is conceptually simple; however, it requires the full encryption of a DVS signature, which usually makes the scheme less efficient and the resulting signature bigger in size.
(Non-delegatability). In quite a number of DVS schemes such as [19, 26, 28, 29] , Alice can delegate her signing capability to a third party say Teddy, by giving Teddy a piece of information derived from her secret key without giving away her secret key. Teddy can then generate signatures on behalf of Alice. This property may be useful in some applications, e.g. proxy signature. However, there are applications in which this is not desirable, e.g. e-voting and online e-library subscription [22] . Suppose that Alice subscribes to an electronic library service provided by Bob. To access the service, Alice sends her DVS to Bob, so that Bob cannot show to others the access history of Alice. If the DVS scheme is delegatable, Alice can give the delegation information to Teddy so that Teddy can also access the service while Bob cannot tell whether the user is Alice or Teddy.
In ICALP 2005, Lipmaa et al. [22] introduced the notion called non-delegatability in the context of DVS. A DVS is non-delegatable if someone can generate a valid DVS signature on behalf of Alice for the designated verifier Bob, then it must 'know' the secret key of either Alice or Bob. In other words, there exists an extractor such that given oracle access to the forger algorithm (and the message), it outputs the secret key of either the signer or the verifier. In [21, 22] , many DVS schemes were shown to be delegatable.
Our work
In the line of research on (S)DVS, there are some problems which remain unsolved since their introduction, for example:
1. constructing an SDVS without random oracles and with better efficiency than the generic construction [16] ; 2. constructing a non-delegatable SDVS; and 3. constructing a non-delegatable DVS in the standard model.
In this work, we give affirmative answers to the first two open problems. We propose a new SDVS scheme provably secure without random oracles. It is simple and more efficient than the aforementioned generic construction. Conceptually, our idea is to make signer S share a common key K with designated verifier V . To sign a message M for V, S uses K as the key to select a pseudorandom function PRF. The SDVS is simply the output of the PRF on input M. The security of the scheme, i.e. unforgeability and privacy of signer's identity, is tightly reduced to the pseudorandomness of the PRF and the intractability of Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem. The scheme also enjoys perfect non-transferability, as S and V can produce the same signature on any message.
This new scheme is delegatable, because the key for the pseudorandom function is derived from the common key shared between S and V , and anyone with this key can sign messages on behalf of S. We then propose another efficient construction of SDVS, which to the best of our knowledge, is the first non-delegatable SDVS scheme. Our scheme makes use of the standard Fiat-Shamir heuristic to convert a proof of knowledge proof into a non-interactive one. The non-delegatability stems from the fact that the signature is a (noninteractive) proof of knowledge of the secret key of either S or V . The price we pay is that the security of the second scheme can only be proven in the random oracle model [4] . Unforgeability of the scheme is based on discrete logarithm (DL) assumption, while the privacy of signer's identity relies on the intractability of Gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH) problem.
Related work
DVS has attracted a lot of attention since its introduction, and many variants have been proposed. They include ring signature [25, 27] , in which the validity of a signature shows that the signature is from a group of signers but tells nothing about the actual identity of the real signer, universal designated verifier signature (UDVS) [14, 18, 28, 31, 33] , in which someone who holds the signer's standard signature can designate any party as the verifier and transform the signature to a DVS signature for that party, multi-designated verifiers signature (MDVS) [16, 20] , in which the signer can designate multiple parties as verifiers for checking the validity of a signature and identity-based designated verifier signature (IBDVS) [5, 11, 15, 30] , which is a DVS in the identity-based setting. In the study of SDVS, Huang et al. [15] and Bhaskar et al. [5] independently proposed an efficient construction, which has short signatures. A signature in their scheme is simply the hash of a message and a common key shared between S and V . The security of their scheme is analyzed in the random oracle model.
Since the introduction of non-delegatability [22] in the context of DVS, many schemes have been shown to be delegatable, e.g. [19, 26, 28, 29] . In Lipmaa et al. [22] , also proposed the first non-delegatable DVS with security based on DDH assumption in the random oracle model. Huang et al. [13] constructed a UDVS scheme with non-delegatability from Boneh-Lynn-Shacham signature [8] . Very recently, Huang et al. [11] proposed the first non-delegatable IBDVS scheme, which is based on Gentry and Silverberg's hierarchical identity-based encryption scheme [10] .
Outline
In the next section, we give the formal definition of SDVS, as well as its security model. We then review in Sect. 3 the definition of PRFs and the assumptions used in our schemes. The two new SDVS schemes, one without random oracles and the other one with non-delegatability property, are presented in Sects. 4 and 5, respectively. We compare these two new schemes with some existing (S)DVS schemes in Sect. 6 and conclude the paper in Sect. 7. -Kg: takes as input 1 k where k is a security parameter and outputs a public/secret key pair, i.e. (pk, sk) ← Kg(1 k ). -Sign: takes as input the secret key of signer S, public keys of S and V (the designated verifier) and message M, and outputs a signature σ , i.e. σ ← Sign(sk s , pk s , pk v , M). -Ver: takes as input the secret key of V , public keys of S and V , message M and an alleged signature σ , and outputs a bit b, which is 1 for acceptance of σ as a valid signature, and 0 for rejection, i.
The correctness of SDVS requires that for any
and any message M ∈ {0, 1} * , we have
A secure SDVS should be unforgeable, non-transferable and satisfying the privacy of signer's identity. If an SDVS is said to be non-delegatable, it should also support nondelegatability. Unforgeability It requires that no one other than the signer S and the designated verifier V can produce a valid signature. We consider the following game played between a challenger C and a PPT adversary A. 
where (k) is a negligible function 1 in the security parameter k, and the probability is taken over the randomness used in Kg, Sign and Sim, and the random coins consumed by D. If the probability is equal to 1/2, we say that the SDVS scheme is perfectly non-transferable (or source hiding).
Privacy of Signer's Identity (PSI) First defined by Laguillaumie and Vergnaud [19] , it formalizes the motivation of SDVS, i.e. no one can tell signatures generated by signer S 0 for V apart from signatures by S 1 for V , if it does not know the secret key of V . Below is the formal definition of PSI, modeled by a game played between the challenger C and a distinguisher D. Non-delegatability Intuitively, it requires that if one produces a valid signature on a message, it must 'know' the secret key of either S or V . So a signature itself is a proof of knowledge of the secret key of either S or V . Formally, we consider the following definition.
Definition 5 (Non-delegatability) Let κ ∈ [0, 1] be the knowledge error and F a forger algorithm. Let F M be F with M as its input, and oracle calls to F M be counted as one step. An SDVS scheme is non-delegatable with knowledge error κ if there exists a positive polynomial poly(·) and a probabilistic oracle machine K such that for every PPT algorithm F, machine K satisfies the following condition:
-Denote by the probability that
, and every message M ∈ {0, 1} * , if > κ, then on input M and on (black box) oracle access to F M , K produces either sk s or sk v in expected polynomial time with probability at least
Remark 2 Our definition of non-delegatability is different from the original one given in [22] . The definition in [22] emphasizes that K can output sk s or sk v in time polynomially proportional to the inverse of − κ, while our definition requires that K outputs a secret key in polynomial time with probability polynomially related to −κ. However, similar to the equivalence between the definitions of proofs of knowledge [2] , it can be shown that Definition 5 is equivalent to that in [22] .
Also notice that the non-delegatability defined above and that in [22] is for signature generation. Another interesting and related property is non-delegatability for signature verification. This property requires that in order to verify a designated signature, the verifier must 'know' the designated verifier's secret key. One can formally define non-delegatability for verification analogously to Definition 5. However, our scheme proposed in Sect. 5 can be only shown to be non-delegatable for signing but not for verification. The difficulty we encounter is that using forking lemma in the random oracle model (as we do in the proof of non-delegatability for signing of our second scheme) does not seem to help us extract the entire secret key from the verifier's one-bit output, because given a signature the output of the hash function has already been determined during the process of signature generation. If we rewind the verifier and assign a new hash value, this would make the verification equation no longer hold. We leave designing an SDVS scheme satisfying the non-delegatability for verification as an open problem.
Tools and assumptions
In this section, we introduce the underlying tools and assumptions used in our SDVS schemes.
Pseudorandom Function Ensemble (PRF) Intuitively, the output distribution of a pseudorandom function should be indistinguishable from that of a truly random function, if the seed for the function is random. and V, and a mapping from strings to functions, φ, such that φ(I(1 k )) and PRF k are identically distributed and
((t, )-pseudorandomness)
For every PPT oracle machine D which runs in time at most t,
where R = {RF k } k∈N is the uniform function ensemble (i.e. ∀k, RF k is uniformly distributed over the set of
Assumptions Let p, q be two large primes such that q| p−1. Let G be a multiplicative cyclic group of order q and g be its generator.
Definition 7 (DL Assumption) The discrete logarithm (DL) assumption (t, )-holds in G if there is no algorithm
A which runs in time at most t, and
where the probability is taken over the random choice of x and the random coins used by A.
Definition 8 (DDH Assumption)
The Decisional DiffieHellman (DDH) assumption (t, ) holds in G if there is no algorithm A which runs in time at most t, and
where the probability is taken over the random choices of a, b, c ∈ Z q , d ∈ {0, 1} and random coins used by A.
Definition 9 (GDH Assumption) The Gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH) assumption (t, ) holds in G if there is no algorithm
A that given access to a DDH oracle O ddh which on input
, runs in time at most t, and
where the probability is taken over the random choices of a, b ∈ Z q and the random coins used by A.
SDVS without random oracle

The scheme
We now propose an SDVS scheme which is secure without random oracles. It is conceptually simple. A signature is the output of a pseudorandom function on a message under a key derived from the public key of the signer or the verifier and the secret key of the other. Let G be a cyclic multiplicative group of large prime order q and g be its generator. Let λ
γ be a family of pseudorandom functions PRF K : {0, 1} λ → {0, 1} with key space {0, 1} γ . We assume that the message space is {0, 1} λ . This assumption can be removed if we use a collision-resistant hash function to map arbitrarily long messages to {0, 1} λ . We also assume that elements of G can be encoded to γ -bit strings. This new SDVS scheme is described in Fig. 1 , where for simplicity, we omit the usage of the encoding, and simply use the shared key (i.e. K = g x s x v ) as the key for the pseudorandom function.
Difference from [5, 15] The SDVS scheme in [5, 15] has short signature and shares a similar structure to that of ours. In [5, 15] , a signature is the output of a hash function on M and a common key shared between S and V . The security is shown in the random oracle model based on the Gap Diffie-Hellman assumption (see Table 1 , Sect. 6 for a detailed comparison). It is also suggested in [15] to replace the hash function with a symmetric encryption SE for obtaining a scheme secure in the standard model. However, it is not clear if we can obtain the provable security of the resulting scheme based on the security of SE. The indistinguishability under chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA) does not guarantee that one cannot compute the encryption of a new message without the knowledge of the secret key. Even if we assume that SE is an authenticated encryption [3] which has both indistinguishability under chosen-ciphertext attacks and ciphertext integrity (IND-CTXT), the resulting SDVS scheme may not satisfy all the security properties. Specifically, the IND-CCA security does not imply that ciphertexts generated using two different keys are indistinguishable. An adversary may be able to learn some information about signers' keys from issuing signing queries, which avails it to distinguish the two signers' signatures. Hence, the PSI of the SE-based SDVS scheme may not be guaranteed.
In our construction instead, we find that if the output of the signing algorithm of an SDVS scheme looks indistinguishable from random strings, it also turns out that two different signers' signatures would be indistinguishable to each other. As demonstrated in the proof of Theorem 3 (to be shown later), the pseudorandomness of the SDVS signatures is a sufficient condition to guarantee the PSI property. However, 
it is not known if it is also a necessary condition. We leave it as our future work to find a new SDVS construction which uses a primitive weaker than PRF.
Security analysis
As a pseudorandom function is a (deterministic) message authentication code with strong unforgeability under chosen message attacks [3] , we have that after obtaining many signatures on messages of its choice, the adversary cannot forge a new pair. Also, the pseudorandomness of the function tells that after obtaining many outputs, the output of the function on a new input still looks random to the distinguisher. Hence, the adversary against the PSI cannot distinguish which signer produced the challenge signature. Formally, we have the following theorems, which together show that the security of SDVS 1 is tightly reduced to the pseudorandomness of PRF and the hardness of DDH problem. As we shall see later (Theorem 2), the scheme SDVS 1 is perfectly non-transferable. Hence, it suffices to consider the case in which the adversary in the games of unforgeability and privacy of signer's identity does not make query to O Sim , as the queries can perfectly be handled by O Sign .
Theorem 1 Suppose that
Proof We prove the theorem by a series of games. Let A be an adversary against the unforgeability of the SDVS 1 above. Let G i be the i-th game, and X i be the event that A outputs a valid forgery in Game G i without violating the constraints. (1)
This game differs from Game G 0 in that when handling the adversary's queries, the key for the pseudorandom function is chosen at random from G, i.e. K ← $ G. Besides, the validity of the adversary's forgery is checked w.r.t. this random key. If the success probabilities of the adversaries in games G 1 and G 0 differ non-negligibly, it leads to an algorithm for breaking the DDH assumption. Therefore, we have that 
By the DDH assumption, we then have Eq. (2).
In Game G 1 , the key for the pseudorandom function is independent from the two public keys, and the adversary can obtain information about the function only via issuing queries. We now modify the game so that the pseudorandom function is replaced with a truly random function. That is, the signature on a message is now randomly chosen from {0, 1} . We have
To see the equation above, we construct an algorithm A 2 to (t 2 , prf )-break the pseudorandomness of F with t 2 ≈ t.
Given an oracle function F(·) which is either a pseudorandom function chosen from F or a truly random function, the adversary A 2 randomly selects a group (G, g, q) Note that in Game G 2 , the signature on a message is a random string from {0, 1} ; therefore, after issuing q Sign signing queries, q Sim simulation queries and q Ver verification queries, the probability that the forgery output by the adversary is valid in Game G 2 is upper bounded by
Combining Eqs. (1)- (4), we get that
This completes the proof.
Theorem 2 SDVS 1 is perfectly non-transferable.
Proof To simulate the signer's signature on M, the designated verifier does the following:
Since both the signer and the verifier can compute the same key K = g x s x v , they can generate the same signature on any message M, i.e. σ = PRF K (M) for each message M. 
Theorem 3 Suppose that there is an adversary
G 1 : This game differs from Game G 0 in that now the key K 0 is chosen at random from G. The difference between D s success probabilities in Game G 0 and Game G 1 is then bounded by the intractability of DDH problem, and we have It is readily seen that if Z = g a 0 c , the game simulated by D is identical to Game G 0 , and D outputs the correct answer with probability Pr[X 0 ]; on the other hand, if Z is a random element of G, the game is identical to Game G 1 , and D outputs the correct bit with probability Pr[X 1 ]. Let the bit output by D 1 be δ. We have that
Therefore, we obtain the Eq. (6).
G 2 : Now, we replace K 1 with a random element of G as well. Note that in this game, both K 0 and K 1 are randomly chosen from G. Similar to Game G 1 , we have that
G 3 : We modify the game so that the function PRF K 0 is now replaced with a truly random function. That is, for each message M, the signer S 0 s signature is now chosen at random from {0, 1} instead of being computed as
To prove the equation above, we construct an algorithm D 2 to (t 2 , prf )-break the pseudorandomness of F with t 2 ≈ t. 0 , g a 1 , g c ) . 
Given an oracle function F(·), D 2 randomly chooses a group (G, g, q) and selects
Note that in Game G 4 both of the signers' signatures are randomly chosen from {0, 1} , including the challenge signature. Thus, the answers to all the queries issued by D provide no help to it. That is, D does not obtain any information about the bit b at all from its queries and the challenge signature. Hence, we have that
Combining Eqs. (5)- (10), we obtain that
Naor-Reingold PRF [23] Let I G(1 k ) be an efficient algorithm that outputs ( p, q, g) where p is a k-bit prime, q is a prime such that p = 2q + 1 and g is an element of order q in Z * p . Let H k be a family of pairwise independent hash functions from {0, 1} k to {0, 1} k/2 . Define the function ensemblẽ F = {F k } k∈N . For every k, a key K of a function inF k consists of an output ( p, q, g ) of I G(1 k ), a random sequence a = (a 0 , a 1 , . . . , a k ) of k + 1 elements of Z q and a hash function h from H k . For any k-bit input x = x 1 x 2 , . . . , x n , the functionf K is defined by:
Naor and Reingold [23] proved that if DDH problem is hard, the function ensemble above is a pseudorandom function ensemble. They also showed how to build a pseudorandom generator (PRG) from DDH assumption. Their PRG works as follows:
where g is of prime order q and a, b ∈ Z q . The PRG doubles the length of the input. If we instantiate the pseudorandom function in SDVS 1 with Naor-Reingold PRF, we should include the description of a pseudorandom generator in the system parameter, which expands the Diffie-Hellman key of S and V to the randomness used for selecting a function iñ F k . To do this, the signer (resp. verifier) applies a universal one-way hash function to g x s x v , which maps to an element of Z q , and then applies Naor-Reingold PRG to the hash value. It then repeats the process above to the right half of the PRG's output, until it obtains enough (pseudo)random numbers for invoking the I G algorithm and for picking the random vector a for the PRF. The complexity of this process is O(k). Therefore, we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 1
If DDH assumption holds, SDVS 1 is a secure strong designated verifier signature scheme in the standard model.
SDVS with non-delegatability
The scheme
The SDVS 1 scheme above is delegatable: signer S or verifier V can simply release K = g x s x v to any third party so that it can sign messages on behalf of S for V . As explained in [22] , this capability may not be desirable in some applications. In this section, we propose another SDVS construction, called SDVS 2 , which is non-delegatable but at the price of provable security in the random oracle model only. The definition of non-delegatability (Definition 5) requires that the signature is a non-interactive proof of knowledge of the secret key of either S or V . Therefore, it is natural to use the Fiat-Shamir heuristic to convert an interactive proof of knowledge of the secret key of either S or V into a signature of knowledge. To make the scheme a strong DVS, we choose to include the common key shared between S and V , i.e. K = pk
into the message to be signed. Thus, the signature of knowledge becomes
Let G be a multiplicative cyclic group of large prime order q, and g be its generator. Let H : {0, 1} * × G 4 → Z q be a collision-resistant hash function, which will be modeled as a random oracle in the security proofs. Our scheme SDVS 2 is described in Fig. 2 .
Security analysis
A signature in our scheme is a proof of knowledge of the secret key, which is the discrete logarithm of the corresponding public key. Using the Forking lemma [24] , we can show that the unforgeability of SDVS 2 could be based on the discrete logarithm assumption. Regarding the PSI property, as the key K = g x s x v is included in the input to the hash function, which is the CDH solution to the public keys of S and V , we are able to show that the intractability of GDH problem tightly reduces to the PSI of SDVS 2 . The non-delegatability stems from the fact that the signature is a (non-interactive) proof of knowledge of the secret key. The role of W in the input to the hash function is to prevent the verifier from releasing K to a third party so that it can verify signatures designated to the verifier. Formally, we have the following theorems. Proof Again, as shown in Theorem 5, SDVS 2 is perfectly non-transferable, we do not need to handle the adversary's queries to oracle O Sim . It is sufficient for us to consider how to deal with signing queries, verification queries and hash queries in the proof. Let F be a forger against the unforgeability of SDVS 2 , which runs in time at most t uf , makes at most q H hash queries, q Sign signing queries, q Sim simulation queries and q Ver verification queries and wins the unforgeability game with probability at least uf . We use it as a subroutine to build another algorithm A for solving the DL problem.
Theorem 4 If DL assumption
Given a random instance of DL problem, i.e. (G, g, q, y) , where y = g x for some unknown x ∈ Z q , A randomly choosesx ∈ Z q and tosses a coin. If the outcome is head, it sets pk s := gx and pk v := y; otherwise, it sets pk s := y and pk v = gx . For simplicity, we assume that the outcome is head. The rest simulation in the other case can be done similarly. A then invokes F on input (pk s , pk v ) and then simulates oracles for it. It maintains a hash table H T , which is initially empty. (c s , z s , c v , z v , W ) Probability Analysis The oracles are simulated by A perfectly using its knowledge ofx (which is the secret key of either pk s or pk v , depending on the outcome of the coin toss at the onset of the simulation). Therefore, F outputs its first valid forgery with probability at least uf . Then, by an analysis similar to that in [7, 24] , we have that with probability at least 2 uf /16q H F outputs its valid forgery in the second run again which satisfies the aforementioned conditions. Since setting y as the public key of S or V (at the onset of the simulation by A) is completely random and the whole simulation is perfect, we then have that with probability at least one-half it holds that c * v =c * v . Thus, from the two valid forgeries, A can successfully compute the discrete log of y with probability at least
Hash Queries Given a query
Theorem 5 SDVS 2 is perfectly non-transferable.
To simulate the signer's signature on message M, the designated verifier first selects at random r v , z s , c s ← $ Z q and computes c s , z s , c v , z v ) as the simulated signature on M. Then, the theorem follows from the fact that both S and V can produce identically distributed proofs using their respective secret key, since they can compute the same key K and (the interactive version of) the proof of knowledge is perfect special honest verifier zero-knowledge. 
If c s =c s , then from Eqs. (11) and (13) at random the hash query in which the second element is the correct value of K (and the last two elements are R s and R v ). This brings a factor 1/q H to the success probability of the extractor. Conditioned on that the random guess is correct, by a similar analysis to that in [7, 24] , we have that with probability at least ( − 1/q)/16, F M produces another valid signature σ on the same message M in the second run, which together with the valid signature in the first run, enables K to extract either sk s or sk v . Hence, the probability that K succeeds in extracting either sk s or sk v is at least ( − 1/q)/16q H . (t gdh , gdh ) Proof Assume that D is an adversary against the privacy of signer's identity, which runs in time t, issues at most q Sign signing queries, q Sim simulation queries and q Ver verification queries and wins with probability 1/2 + . Using D as a subroutine, we build an algorithm E for solving the GDH problem.
Theorem 7 If GDH assumption
Given a random instance of GDH problem, say, (G, g, q, g u , g w ) and a DDH oracle, E randomly selects u ∈ Z q and sets pk s 0 = g u , pk s 1 = g u g u and pk v = g w . It invokes D on input (pk s 0 , pk s 1 , pk v ) and then simulates oracles for it. E maintains two tables, H T and ST , which are initially empty. For simplicity, we assume that D does not duplicate queries, and we do not consider queries to O Sim in the proof. , z s , c v , z v ) The intuition behind the simulation of verification oracle is that if a signature was ever returned by E to the adversary, it must be valid. Otherwise, if the signature is invalid, certainly the oracle should return 0; if it is valid, then the adversary forged a valid signature. In this case, with probability at least
Hash Queries Given an input
According to the simulation of the hash oracle, E obtained g uw and halted. Thus, the only case left is that the signature is valid but the adversary did not ask the random oracle for the hash of (M, K , R s , R v ). Therefore, the simulation of the verification oracle would cause at most 1/q difference to the the adversary's success probability.
When , except that it guesses the hash value at random, which is correct with probability at most 1/q. Therefore, we have that
Remark 3
The security reduction for unforgeability is not tight, since we need to rewind the adversary in order to extract the discrete logarithm from the signatures. We could also try to apply Katz-Wang technique [17] to obtain a tight reduction. However, the unforgeability would then rely on DDH assumption, which is stronger than the one we are currently using. Besides, the proof of PSI may still need the GDH assumption. In a consequence, the security of the new scheme relies on two mutually conflictive assumptions, e.g. DDH and GDH.
Remark 4 From the proof above, we can see that the underlying assumption of PSI can be further weakened to Strong Diffie-Hellman (Strong DH) assumption [1] 2 , since each query to the DDH oracle is of the form ( * , g w , K ) where the g w is fixed in all the queries. The same holds for the short SDVS scheme in [5, 15] as well.
Comparison
In Table 1 , we compare our two SDVS schemes with some existing (S)DVS schemes. The third and the fourth rows of the table consider the size of a public key and that of a signature, respectively. The fifth and sixth rows count the numbers of exponentiations and pairings in signature generation and verification, respectively. The seventh row considers whether the scheme supports PSI. The eighth row considers whether the scheme has non-delegatability. The ninth row considers whether the security could be proved without random oracles. The last row shows the underlying number-theoretic assumptions for the security.
In terms of signature size, SDVS 1 that is secure in the standard model outperforms schemes in [16, 20, 22] , which are secure in the random oracle model, and is comparable with [5, 15] which by far is the most efficient SDVS in the random oracle model. SDVS 1 also has comparable computational complexity as [5, 15] . On the other side, to the best of our knowledge, SDVS 2 is the first non-delegatable SDVS scheme, which compared with Lipmaa et al.'s DVS scheme [22] , and has the same signature size and shorter public key, but looser reduction for unforgeability.
Conclusion and future work
In this paper, we proposed an efficient SDVS scheme based on pseudorandom functions. It has short signatures and is provably secure in the standard model. We then proposed another scheme, which is the first SDVS scheme with nondelegatability. The price we need to pay is the provable security in the random oracle model. Many problems about DVS are still open, for example, the construction of non-delegatable (S)DVS without random oracles. We leave it as our future work.
